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The robustness of distributed optimization is an emerging field of study, mo-
tivated by various applications of distributed optimization including distributed
machine learning, distributed sensing, and swarm robotics. With the rapid ex-
pansion of the scale of distributed systems, resilient distributed algorithms for
optimization are needed, in order to mitigate system failures, communication
issues, or even malicious attacks. This survey investigates the current state
of fault-tolerance research in distributed optimization, and aims to provide an
overview of the existing studies on both fault-tolerant distributed optimization
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1 Introduction
With rapid development in communication, sensing and learning systems, devel-
opment in computation and storage capacity of computer systems, and growth in
data collection, the problems in networked systems have gained significant atten-
tion [29, 39, 89, 122, 126]. A networked system1 typically consists of a number of
agents, which work collaboratively to achieve certain global objective. Many prob-
lems in networked systems can be solved in the framework of optimization [10].
The distributed nature of these problems and performance limitations of centralized
strategies lead to increasing interest in distributed approaches to solve the optimiza-
tion problems [10, 80].
Among all the topics in researches of distributed systems, the robustness of
networked systems received recent research attention [30, 59, 71]. People have re-
alized, in both theory and practice, that agent failures or adversarial behaviors of
some agents may render non-robust distributed algorithms useless. In the context
of distributed optimization, the problem of fault-tolerance, sometimes also resilience
or robustness, becomes increasingly important. People wish to solve optimization
problems distributed, while also being able to counter agent failures, communication
issues, malicious attackers, etc., while utilizing computational power from various
sources [97–101, 103]. This survey intends to study the current state of researches
in fault-tolerant distributed optimization problems.
1.1 Distributed Optimization
Generally, an optimization problem intends to find optima (maximum or minimum
point(s)) of a given objective function [37]. In the problem of distributed optimiza-
tion, we consider a multi-agent system (or network) of n agents, and each agent
i has a local cost function Qi(x), where x ∈ Rd is the optimization variable, a d-
dimensional vector of real values. The objective of distributed optimization is to







while the algorithm is typically in a distributed manner, i.e., with local computation
by the agents and communication among the agents. In practice, an algorithm of
distributed optimization can also be required to output only one of the minimum
points to the global objective function when there are multiple possible solutions,
i.e., output a vector x∗ such that





The problem of optimization with multiple agents has been studied since the end
of last century in the context of parallel and distributed computation [5, 108, 109].
1In this survey, without specification, the phrase networked system is interchangeable to dis-
tributed system and multi-agent system, whilst “network system” stresses on the communication
network, “distributed system” stresses on the distributed nature of the task, and “multi-agent
system” stresses on the number of members participating in the system.
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In recent years it has gained renewed interest due to its applications in various fields,
including communication networks, power systems, sensor networks, and machine
learning [14, 39, 79, 80, 91]. Recent reviews of distributed optimization include
following surveys and books: [10, 40, 77, 80, 89, 91, 119].
1.2 Fault-tolerance in distributed optimization
The studies on fault-tolerance start from the increasing need of robustness in dis-
tributed systems. In many applications of distributed system, the reliability of such
a system can be affected by component failures, e.g., malfunctioning agents, com-
munication difficulties, or malicious attacks, e.g., some agents intend to sabotage
the collective effort by sending false information [6, 12, 15, 61]; therefore, the central
goal regarding robustness of distributed systems is to make the automated systems
able of making correct decisions in presence of faulty data [12]. In the context of
general distributed systems, the two major tools for solving the problem algorith-
mically are Byzantine agreement [28, 62] and sensor fusion [20, 72]. Byzantine
agreement allows a distributed decision-making system tolerate a certain number of
failed agents, while sensor fusion enhances the accuracy of sensors (or agents) by
deploying sensors redundantly.
In the context of distributed optimization, fault-tolerance is also gaining more
attention for the same reason. Correspondingly, there are also two major lines of
work. One intends to allow the algorithm to produce correct output in presence of a
certain number of failed agents. This includes countering faulty agents regardless of
their behavior, i.e., Byzantine fault-tolerance, or Byzantine resilience [45, 101, 104],
or modeling and countering certain kinds of failures or adversarial behaviors [30, 59].
The other line of work intends to counter faulty agents by assigning redundant work-
loads to agents [18, 85].
There are different distributed optimization models considered by the fault-
tolerance problem. Some analyses take the communication topology of the network
into consideration [102, 104, 125], while other researches focus on one or two ma-
jor system architectures [6, 19, 45]. Some papers consider only the case in which
the cost functions are scalar-valued [101, 104]. Some works are interested in the
fault-tolerant problems in specific distributed optimization tasks (e.g., distributed
machine learning), or specific distributed optimization methods (e.g., distributed
gradient descent or distributed stochastic gradient descent) [19, 49, 68].
This survey intends to investigate the current state of researches in the fault-
tolerant distributed optimization problem. The rest of this survey is organized
as follows. In Section 2 we revisit some related concepts and notations in graph
theory and Byzantine consensus, the two related fields. In Section 3 we discuss the
existing research in Byzantine fault-tolerance problem of distributed optimization,
including the problem formulation, solvability, and algorithms. We also discuss
the special case of Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed machine learning. We then
discuss some other fault-tolerance problems in distributed optimization, including
different adversary models, and possible combination of privacy-preservation and
fault-tolerance in Section 4. Finally, we summarize this survey in Section 5 and
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discuss possible future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some backgrounds related to fault-tolerance in dis-
tributed optimization.
2.1 Graph theory
We revisit some basics in graph theory [41] that is also used in modeling and anal-
ysis of fault-tolerant distributed optimization algorithms. Let G = (V, E) denote
a directed graph with the set of nodes (in our case, agents) V = {1, ..., n} and the
set of edges E ⊆ V × V. (i, j) denotes a directed edge from node i to node j. A
graph becomes undirected if and only if (i, j) ∈ E always implies (j, i) ∈ E . For
simplicity, we assume in this survey that no directed graph contains self loop, i.e.,
(i, i) /∈ E for all i ∈ V, unless specified otherwise. The in-neighbors of node i
consists of all nodes that can transmit information to node i directly, denoted by
the set N ini = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E}. In contrast, the out-neighbors of node i con-
sists of all nodes that i can transmit information to directly, denoted by the set
N outi = {j ∈ V|(i, j) ∈ E}. For undirected graphs, we denote Ni = N ini = N outi as
the neighbors of node i.
A directed path from node i1 to ik is a sequence of nodes {i1, ..., ik} such that
(ij , ij+1) ∈ E for j = 1, ..., k − 1; and if such a path exists, we say ik is reachable
from i1. An undirected graph is connected if for any i, j ∈ V, i 6= j, there exists
a path between i and j. A directed graph is strongly connected if every node is
reachable from every other node. The vertex cut S ⊂ V of a connected graph of
nodes that by removing the nodes in S and edges connected to them, the graph
becomes unconnected. The (vertex) connectivity of a connected graph is the size
of the graph’s minimum vertex cut. A source component in a directed graph is a
subset of nodes, in which each node has a path to every other nodes in the graph.
A connected dominating set of an undirected connected graph is the set of nodes in
which every node not in the set has a neighbor in the set, and the set of nodes with
their edges forms a connected subgraph itself.
A communication network may also be modeled with time-varying feature, de-
noted by G(t) = (V, E(t)), where the edge set can change over time. Path, connec-
tivity, and neighborhood sets defined above can also be adapted to this model with
the time stamp t.
2.2 Byzantine consensus
Although Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization is proposed quite re-
cently [97], the question of Byzantine consensus has been proposed and well studied
for some time [28, 62, 63, 70, 81]. It would be useful for us to revisit the concepts
of consensus and Byzantine consensus, the two basic problems in distributed com-
puting.
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In the original consensus problem (sometimes agreement problem) in a multi-
agent system, each of the n agents starts with an input of either 0 or 1. By com-
munications between agents, the goal is for all the agents to eventually decide on a
value in {0, 1} that satisfies the following conditions:
Agreement No two agents decide on different values;
Validity If all agent start with the same value, they decide on that
value, and
Termination All agents eventually decide.
Intuitively, a consensus protocol allows a group of agents in a multi-agent system to
agree on a single value, after certain amount of communications.
The Byzantine consensus problem expands the original problem that instead
of 0 or 1, each agent can now hold a value v ∈ V , where V is a set of allowed
values. Also, some agents in the system can be non-compliant to the prescribed
algorithm and exhibit arbitrary behavior, including starting in an arbitrary state,
sending arbitrary message, and making arbitrary updates to its value. These agents
are called Byzantine faulty agents. Under this setting, the goal is to satisfy the
following correctness conditions:
Agreement No two non-faulty agents decide on different values;
Validity If all non-faulty agent start with the same value v ∈ V , they
decide on the value v, and
Termination All non-faulty agents eventually decide.
The major change here comparing to plain consensus is that it is only reasonable to
apply correctness conditions on all non-faulty agents in Byzantine consensus. Stud-
ies on Byzantine consensus include necessity and sufficiency conditions for solving
the problem, and practical algorithms under different system architectures. Readers
can refer to [70] for detailed introduction on Byzantine consensus.
The consensus problem can be further extended to consensus on multi-dimensional
values (i.e., vectors) [111, 112], asymptotic or approximate consensus with reason-
able definition of acceptable outcome [3, 38, 63, 107], and their corresponding Byzan-
tine version [63, 74, 112]. Results in Byzantine consensus are important in research
of Byzantine distributed optimization, since Byzantine optimization can in fact be
viewed as a special case of Byzantine consensus [97].
2.3 Notations
We summarize the notations frequently used in this survey in Table 1 for refer-
ence. The table includes both notations already introduced and those that will be
introduced in the following sections.
3 Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization
The majority of current studies on the fault-tolerant distributed optimization prob-
lem assumes the faulty agents to be Byzantine, i.e., there is no assumption made
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Table 1: Notations used in this survey.
Notation Meaning
R The set of real numbers.
Rd The set of d-dimensional real-valued vectors.
Rd×n The set of real-valued matrices with d rows and n columns.
Z The set of integers.
G(V, E) The graph G, with node (agent) set V and edge set E .
(i, j) ∈ E A directed edge from node i to node j in E .
N ini , N outi , Ni In-, out-neighbors, and neighbors of node i.
G(t) = (V, E(t)) The graph G at time stamp t.
n The number of agents in a distributed system.
f The upper-bound of the number of faulty agents in a distri-
buted system.
t The iteration number in an iterative algorithm.
x[k] The k-th element of a vector x.
Qi(x) The cost function of agent i.
vti Some vector v produced by agent i at time t.
A, Aij A matrix A and the element of A at position (i, j).
B The set of faulty (adversarial) agents.
H The set of non-faulty (honest) agents.
z ∼ D A random variable z drawn from distribution D.
|·| Absolute value or cardinality of a set.
‖·‖ Some kind of norm.
〈·, ·〉 Inner product of two vectors.
E Expectation.
dist (·, ·) Hausdorff distance between two sets (including points). Also
see Appendix A.
∇f(x) Derivative of a function f(x).
on the behavior of faulty agents in the system. This problem is often referred to
as the Byzantine fault-tolerant, Byzantine-resilient, or Byzantine-robust distributed
optimization problem. The advantage of formulating the problem this way is obvi-
ous: by making no behavioral assumption on faulty agents, the applicability of the
results is quite broad. It is also a reasonable choice, since in practice, the trusted
parts often cannot predict what faulty agents would do.
3.1 Problem formulation
Su and Vaidya [97] formally proposed the Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed opti-
mization problem of a sum of convex cost functions with real-valued scalar input and
output in a complete communication graph. Recall in Section 1.1 that we discussed
the formulation of distributed optimization, where each agent i in the system of n
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agents has a cost function Qi(x), and the goal is to find a point x
∗ such that





In presence of faulty-agents, it is impractical to achieve the goal stated in (2), since
it is possible that the non-faulty agents can never know any information regarding
cost functions of the faulty agents.
Suppose among the n agents in the system, up to f agents may be Byzantine
faulty. Let V = {1, ..., n} denote the set of all agents, B denote the set of faulty
agents, and H = V − B be the set of non-faulty agents. The problem assumes
|B| ≤ f . Also suppose Qi : R → R for all i. Su and Vaidya [97] showed that the
goal of finding a minimum point for the averaged cost functions of all non-faulty
agents







is also impossible. However, it is possible to achieve the following goal,





such that ∀i ∈ H, αi ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈H
αi = 1. (5)
i.e., find a minimum point of a convex combination of non-faulty agents’ cost func-
tions. Ideally, we want all αi =
1
|H|
, effectively goal (4). Therefore, we want to
maximize the number of αi’s bounded away from 0. The authors proved in [97] that
such a goal can be achieved with certain restrictions when defining “bounded away
from 0”, and the maximum achievable number of bounded away weights (i.e., αi’s)
is |H| − f . The results are further extended to arbitrary directed networks in [98].
We can easily generalize the ideal goal (4) to real-valued multivariate cost func-
tions: suppose for every agent i, its cost function Qi : Rd → R, the goal becomes







Comparing to the scalar version, this problem has wider applicability. However, due
to the impossibility of its scalar counterpart, solving (6) is not generally achievable
either. Note that optimization goal (6) on the averaged cost functions is the same
as the following





i.e., the aggregated cost functions, since a positive scaling coefficient does not affect
the optimum.
6
For clarification of the concepts, we call the set of the minimum points





the true minimum point set. Correspondingly, the point of that set x∗ ∈ X∗ is called
a true minimum point. For any subset of agents S ⊆ V, we also use the following
notations:





for the minimum point set of the aggregated cost functions of agents in S, and
xs ∈ XS for a minimum point in XS .
Note that without specifying the property of cost functions of agents in an ar-
bitrary subset S, the property of the minimum point set XS is also undecided,
including but not limited to the following possible cases: (1) |XS |=0, i.e., there is
no minimum point; (2) |XS |=1, i.e., there is only one minimum point; (3) the set
XS forms a region or shape in the Euclidean space Rd, or (4) the set XS consists of
many unconnected parts.
3.2 Solvability: the importance of redundancy in cost-functions
Since it is impossible to solve the Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization
problem (6) in general, researchers eyed on reasonable extra conditions that can
help solving the problem. A line of work shows the relationship between solvabil-
ity and redundancy in cost functions. The cost functions of agents, although not
identical, have underlying connections with each other. This kind of conditions can
help achieving the optimization goal without requiring side knowledge of the agents.
Su and Vaidya [98] in their extension of their previous work [97] analyzed the
scenario where the cost function Qi(x) of each agent i is formed as a convex com-
bination of k input functions. Formally, a function h : R → R is admissible if
h(x) is convex, L-Lipschitz continuous, and its minimum point set arg minh(x) is
non-empty and compact. Given k admissible input functions h1(x), ..., hk(x), there
exists a matrix A ∈ Rk×n, such that the cost function Qi(x) of each agent i ∈ V is
of the form
Qi(x) = A1ih1(x) + A2ih2(x) + ...+ Akihk(x), (10)
where Aji ≥ 0 and
∑k
j=1Aji = 1 for all i ∈ V and j = 1, ..., k. The goal is to find a
solution x̃ ∈ R to the following optimization problem








instead of (4), in presence of up to f Byzantine faulty agents. The authors consid-
ered both cases where the agents are aware or unaware of the matrix A. Suppose
agents are aware of A, (11) can be achieved if A can correct up to f arbitrary
entry-wise errors as stated in [13] and the communication graph admits Byzantine
broadcast [11]. On the other hand, suppose agents are not aware of A beforehand,
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(11) can also be solved if all input functions share at least one common minimum
point, and there is a necessity condition of n > 3f setting an upper bound for this
special case.
Gupta and Vaidya [45, 46] studied a different type of redundancy in cost func-
tions named 2f -redundancy, defined as follows:
Definition 1 (2f-redundancy) The cost functions of a set of non-faulty agents










Note that here x ∈ Rd for any d ∈ Z>0. This redundancy condition implies that
the aggregated cost functions of every n − 2f non-faulty agents minimizes at the
same set of points. It is further showed that it is only possible to achieve goal
(6) in presence of up to f Byzantine faulty agents if the non-faulty cost functions
satisfy 2f -redundancy. Note that this result does not require convexity of the cost
functions. The authors also pointed out that although the conditions mentioned in
Definition 1 appears technical, in many practical applications, such redundancy in
cost functions “occurs naturally” [45], including applications in distributed sensing
and distributed learning.
Liu et al. [68] further generalized the redundancy notation to (2f, ε)-redundancy,
where ε is an approximate parameter, defined as follows:
Definition 2 ((2f, ε)-redundancy) The agents’ cost functions are said to have
(2f, ε)-redundancy property if and only if for every pair of subsets S, Ŝ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
with |S| = n− f ,











 ≤ ε. (13)
where dist (·, ·) is Hausdorff distance2 between two sets in d-dimensional Euclidean
space. Intuitively, this redundancy condition implies that every set of no less than
n − 2f non-faulty agents has its minimum point set of aggregated cost functions
within ε distance to the true minimum point set. The authors showed that (2f, ε)-
redundancy is necessary and sufficient for a deterministic algorithm to output a
point close enough (also measured by ε) to a true minimum point. Similarly, this
finding also does not require the cost functions to be convex, but only requires a
compact minimum point set.
3.3 Practical solutions to Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed op-
timization problems
After analyzing the theoretical solvabitlity of Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed
optimization problems, we further dive in to the algorithms that can be used to
solve the problems in practice.





















Figure 1: Illustrations of the two major network architectures in Byzantine fault-
tolerant distributed optimization problems.
3.3.1 Commonly-studied system architectures
Before we start, it is useful to discuss first the different system architectures those
algorithms are designed for. As a recently started research topic, researchers make
various assumptions to the system. But most of those assumptions can be summa-
rized into the following categories.
Network architectures There are two major architectures studied in the re-
searches of Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization, illustrated in Figure 1:
(1) the server-based architecture (or centralized architecture) and (2) the peer-to-
peer architecture (or decentralized architecture). In the server-based architecture,
in the majority of researches, there is one server and n agents; the agents com-
municate with the server, but not with each other. It is usually assumed that the
server is trustworthy, but up to f agents may be Byzantine faulty. There are also
some works that use multiple servers or different communication models in order
to achieve other specific goals. Unless specified otherwise, when referring to the
server-based architecture in this survey, we are referring to the former common ar-
chitecture. In the peer-to-peer architecture, n agents are connected with each other,
and up to f of those agents may be Byzantine faulty. Note that the network is not
necessarily complete, undirected, or fixed in the peer-to-peer architecture.
Problems under the two architectures can sometimes be equivalent. For exam-
ple, provided that f <
n
3
, any algorithm for the server-based architecture can be
simulated in a complete-graph peer-to-peer architecture using Byzantine broadcast
primitive [70]. Therefore, some algorithms applicable to server-based architecture
are also theoretically applicable to complete-graph peer-to-peer architecture.
Byzantine status We briefly mention that for the majority of the algorithms, the
Byzantine status of agents may change during the execution of an algorithm, i.e,
at different times, different agents may be Byzantine faulty, but the total number
of agents exhibiting Byzantine behavior at any given time is bounded by f . An
example in practice for the reason of this assumption is that any agent in a dis-
tributed system can experience system failure, but statistically, the total number of
failed agents can be bounded by a certain number. Unless otherwise specified, the
algorithms we introduced below do not require fixed Byzantine status.
However, in some researches, it is also useful to assume that Byzantine faulty
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agents are fixed during an execution. This kind of assumptions are necessary for
some algorithms to achieve their fault-tolerance goal. We will discuss several algo-
rithms of such kind in the following sections.
Data distributions In a general distributed optimization problem, each agent i
has its own cost function Qi(x) that is potentially different from other agents’. If
in server-based network, the server does not have a cost function, nor does it have
the knowledge of cost functions of agents.
In distributed learning setting, however, there might be different assumptions.
The assumptions mainly fall in these categories: (1) all agents have their data
samples drawn from the same data distribution D; (2) each agent i has their data
drawn from a data distribution Di, or (3) all agents have the same dataset (parallel
setting), including the cases in server-based network, the server also has the same
dataset, or the server assigns (sends) data samples to agents during the training
process. We will discuss fault-tolerance in distributed learning further in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Gradient descent with gradient filters
One major category of these algorithms is called gradient filters [49], or robust gra-
dient aggregation [7, 19], which are designed and used mainly with (distributed)
gradient descent (abbr. DGD) [78]. DGD is a popular method solving distributed
optimization problems, hence it is natural to build upon it to achieve Byzantine
fault-tolerance.
DGD is originally designed for peer-to-peer architecture, where each agent keeps
its own local estimate xi. During the algorithm, the agents communicate in itera-
tions. In each iteration t, each agent i shares its local estimate xi with other agents,
then performs a consensus step and then a descent step. Specifically, the agent






j − ηtgti , (14)
where xti ∈ Rd indicates agent i’s local estimate at iteration t, wtij is the weight of





Rn×n is doubly stochastic for all t, gti is the (sub)gradient3 of the local cost function
Qi(x) at xi(t), and ηt > 0 is a diminishing step size
4. For server-based architecture,
DGD can also be adapted [67].
One simple version of server-based DGD is described in Algorithm 1. Generally
speaking, in each iteration t, each agent receives the current estimate xt from the
server, computes and sends its update gti back to the server; the server keeps the
current estimate xt, computes its update in iteration t using all update vector re-
ceived from the agents, and updates its current estimate according to (15).
3DGD is originally proposed for convex but not necessarily differentiable cost functions.
4Defined in Appendix A
10
Algorithm 1 DGD for server-based architecture
1: procedure DgdServer . Server executes this procedure
2: Initialize: arbitrarily select an initial estimate x0
3: Loop until convergence. For current iteration t = 0, 1, 2, ...:
4: Broadcast the current estimate xt to all agents
5: Wait until receive gradient gti from each agent i
6: Update the current estimate xt by summing the updates of all agents:





8: procedure DgdAgent . Each agent i executes this procedure
9: Loop until server stops. For each iteration t:
10: Wait until receive current server estimate xt
11: Compute (sub)gradient of local function Qi(x) at x
t:
gti = ∇Qi(xt) (16)
12: Send gti as agent i’s update to the server
13: end procedure
Byzantine agents in the system may not follow the prescribed algorithms. Specif-
ically, in line 11 of Algorithm 1, instead of computing and sending its gradient
following (16), a Byzantine agent may choose to send arbitrary information as its
update. When the server receives gti ’s from agents in line 5, some of them may be
incorrect. In fact, Blanchard et al. [6] showed that no linear combination methods
for aggregating the updates (including summing and averaging, indicated by (15))
can tolerate even a single Byzantine agent. Thus comes the gradient filters, methods
that redesign the aggregation rule. A general framework for server-based Byzan-
tine fault-tolerant optimization with DGD, or Byzantine gradient descent (BGD),
is shown in Algorithm 2.
The major difference between Algorithms 2 and DGD is (17): instead of up-
dating the estimates by the sum of all agents updates, BGD uses an aggregation
rule GradFilter (·). Generally speaking, GradFilter : Rd × n → Rd is a function that
takes n vectors of d-dimension, and output a vector of d-dimension. Normally, the






and the output is used as the server’s update at iteration t. Also note that only
non-faulty agents follow the procedure BgdAgent and send their correct gradient
as its update. Byzantine agents may behave arbitrarily, including but not limited
to sending its correct update, sending an arbitrary d-dimensional vector, sending
other arbitrary information, or not sending anything. Note that only an arbitrary
d-dimensional vector would confuse the server, since other behaviors will immedi-
ately indicate the agent deviating from the prescribed algorithm, and therefore must
be faulty; if the Byzantine status of agents is fixed, the algorithm can further remove
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Algorithm 2 BGD framework for server-based architecture
1: procedure BgdServer . Server executes this procedure
2: Initialize: arbitrarily select an initial estimate x0
3: Loop until convergence. For current iteration t = 0, 1, 2, ...:
4: Broadcast the current estimate xt to all agents
5: Wait until receive gradient gti from each agent i
6: Update the current estimate xt by summing the updates of all agents:








8: procedure BgdAgent . Each non-faulty agent i executes this procedure
9: Loop until server stops. For each iteration t:
10: Wait until receive current server estimate xt
11: Compute (sub)gradient of local function Qi(x) at x
t:
gti = ∇Qi(xt) (18)
12: Send gti as agent i’s update to the server
13: end procedure
the ill-behaved agent in future iterations.
Suppose out of n agents, up to f can be Byzantine faulty. We introduce some




as the set of update
vectors unless otherwise specified.
Krum Krum [6] is an angle-based (or direction-based) gradient filter, built upon
a Krum score s(i). Suppose among the set of vectors gt, i→ j denotes the fact that
gtj belongs to the n− f − 2 closest vectors to gti , with distance between two vectors
defined by some norm ‖·‖. The score s(i) =
∑
i→j
∥∥∥gti − gtj∥∥∥2, i.e., the sum of the
distances between gti and the n− f − 2 vectors closest to it. Then,
GradFilter
(




= gti∗ , (19)
where i∗ is an agent with the smallest score s(i∗). Krum outputs one of the vectors
submitted by the agents. The expected time complexity of computing this filter
is O(n2d). Krum is originally proposed as a distributed machine learning filter for
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), but it can also be applied to general optimization
problems.
Multi-KRUM Multi-Krum [6, 7] is a variant of Krum. Instead of selecting one
vector, multi-Krum selects m vectors and averages them, where m is a hyperparam-
eter. There are two versions, the first version (also known as m-Krum) iterates m
times, each time it calculates the scores for all vectors in gt, selects a vector with
the highest score and remove it from the set gt; the second version selects m vectors
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with the m smallest scores. Obviously, the time complexity of the second version is
the same as Krum, which is significantly better than that of the first version.
Coordinate-wise methods Coordinate-wise median and trimmed mean [120]
process the received vectors by coordinates. Suppose v[k] denotes the k-th coordi-























, for trimmed mean,
(20)
where median{·} finds the median from a set of scalars, while trmeanβ{·} first drop
the smallest and largest β fraction, then computes the mean of the rest of the values
from a set of scalars. β is a hyperparameter, which is required to be larger than the
fraction of faulty agents α, i.e., β ≥ α = f/n. Note that coordinate-wise median
does not require a known fraction of faulty agents.
Phocas [116] is a variant of trimmed mean method. The authors also noted that
for coordinate-wise methods, the number of faults can also be viewed coordinate-
wisely, i.e., the update vectors from every agent can be corrupted, so long as for
each coordinate k ∈ {1, ..., d}, the number of faulty values in the set {gti [k]}ni=1 is
upper-bounded by f . Another coordinate-wise method, mean around median [115],
calculates each coordinate k by the mean of n− f values gti [k]’s that are closest to
the median of all values. These filters are also originally proposed as a distributed
learning filter for SGD.
Geometric median Geometric median also has some robustness [19, 75, 90, 115],
and sometimes is used as a benchmark comparing other gradient filters. Geometric




[21]. That being said, in practice the (geometric) median-based aggregation still
dominates the training time in large-scale settings [18].
Median of means Geometric median of means [19] extends the statistical esti-
mator to vectors. Specifically, suppose b divides n, agents are divided into k = n/b
groups, each of size b. In each iteration, the gradient filter finds the mean vector



















The number of groups k is a hyperparameter, which should be chosen such that
k > 2f . This filter is originally proposed as a distributed learning filter for SGD.
MDA Minimum-diameter averaging [32], also called Brute [75], is another median-
based method, originally proposed as a statistical estimator in [90]. It uses the
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∥∥gti − gtj∥∥) . (22)







. This filter is originally
proposed as a distributed learning filter for SGD.
Norm-based methods Norm filtering (or comparative gradient elimination, CGE)
and norm-cap filtering (or comparative gradient clipping, CGC) [43, 46, 49] are a
group of filters looking at the norms of the vectors. Intuitively, these filters keep
the n− f vectors in gt with smallest norms, while dropping the rest vectors (elimi-
nation) or scaling the rest so that they also have the n− f -largest norm (clipping).
Formally, suppose the vectors in gt are sorted as follows:∥∥gti1∥∥ ≤ ... ≤ ∥∥∥gtin−f∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥gtin−f+1∥∥∥ ≤ ... ≤ ∥∥gtn∥∥ , (23)

















∥∥∥gtin−f∥∥∥∥∥gij∥∥ gtij , for CGC.
(24)
The computational complexity of the two methods are both O(n(log n + d)). In-
tuitively, even if a gradient from faulty agent is kept, its norm is bounded by a
gradient from non-faulty agent, and therefore could not do much damage to the
server’s update. The two methods are originally proposed in the context of dis-
tributed linear regression, and analyzed also in general distributed optimization [45]
and distributed learning [49].
Bulyan Bulyan [75] is a meta-aggregation rule that can be applied on another
gradient filters GradFilter. Bulyan consists of two steps. In the first step, Bulyan
iterates n− 2f times; in each iteration, it runs GradFilter on the set gt, selects a gti
closest to GradFilter’s output, add it to a set S, and remove it from gt. After the first
step, the set S contains n− 2f vectors. In the second step, Bulyan generates a new
d-dimensional vector coordinate-wisely from the n−2f vectors with a median-based
method, and uses it as the update. It is designed such that it has provable resilience
property even if GradFilter in use does not have such a property (e.g., geometric
median).
It is worth noting that the convergence analyses of most of the gradient filters
requires standard assumptions like continuity, differentiability, Lipschitz smooth-
ness, convexity, strong convexity, including those that are proposed for distributed
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learning or SGD. However, the most popular machine learning methods, including
deep neural networks, are known to be generally non-convex [22, 56].
It is also worth noting that some gradient filters such as coordinate-wise trimmed
mean and CGE are also analyzed under the peer-to-peer setting [47].
For reference purpose, we summarize all gradient filters listed in this section in
Table 2 in Appendix B.
3.3.3 Gradient coding
One of the applications of coding theory is to enable error correction [50]. Gradient
coding is originally proposed as a straggler mitigation method [105], which is used
to speed up synchronous distributed first-order methods [17, 23, 88]. Several works
build upon it and extend it to the adversarial setup. Generally, this type of methods
work under the parallelization setting of distributed learning, where agents (and
server, if any) all have the same dataset.
Draco Draco [18] is a gradient-coding-based method, in which the server assigns
same data samples to (on average) r agents, agents compute multiple stochastic
gradients and send the gradients to the server in a coded way. The server receives
the coded messages from the agents, and decodes the message to recover the correct
gradients and identifies the faulty messages. With proper-selected coding method,
Draco can tolerate up to (r − 1)/2 Byzantine agents with linear-time encoding
and decoding. The assignment of same tasks to multiple agents is also known
as algorithmic redundancy. DETOX [85] is an extension of Draco that combines
algorithmic redundancy with robust aggregation, with increased speed and improved
robustness.
Randomized reactive redundancy After Draco and DETOX, Gupta and Vaidya
[44] proposed a similar coding-based framework, in which instead of applying cod-
ing every iteration, the server invokes the coding scheme (i.e., check for faults) with
probability q > 0, while in other iterations, the server simply carries out DGD. By
properly choosing the value of q, this framework reduces the computational over-
head caused by coding to arbitrarily small. The scheme is especially effective when
Byzantine agents are fixed, since once detected, the faulty agents will be removed.
The authors also proposed heuristic checking by server and combination with gra-
dient filters.
3.3.4 Other methods
There are some other methods that do not fall into the above major categories.
Though those methods are more or less related to previous methods.
Zeno Zeno [117] is a gradient aggregation rule based on the fact that the server
obtains certain number of data samples, designed for distributed learning with SGD.
In each iteration, instead of assigning data samples to agents, the server calculates
a reliability score of the vectors sent from the agents, based on the fact that all
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the data samples are drawn from the same data distribution D. The server then
aggregate using those n− f most reliable gradients to obtain its update.
One-round robust aggregation Instead of checking or filtering every iteration,
Yin et al. [120] propose a Robust One-round Algorithm, in which the non-faulty
agents conduct their own optimization process using their local cost functions sep-
arately, and send their final estimates to the server; Byzantine agents may send
arbitrary information. The server then aggregates the estimates (including faulty
ones) to compute its own final estimate. There is no communication between agents
and the server the whole process except the final step. In [120] geometric median is
used as the final aggregation rule, and convergence analysis is provided. The method
is proposed originally for distributed learning, and suppose all agents have the same
data distribution, the method can achieve comparable empirical performance to
some gradient filters.
Variance reducing techniques There are certain techniques used in machine
learning known to have the ability of reducing the variance of stochastic gradients.
Since the stochastic gradients are generated from randomly drawn data samples, a
variance-reduce method is possible to speed up the training process by “stablizing”
the gradients [24, 84]. Gupta et al. [49] empirically studied that averaging histor-
ical gradients and increasing batch size helps reducing the variance of stochastic
gradients, and therefore boosts the performance of fault-tolerant gradient filters.
Karimireddy et al. [60] showed that using momentum [84] helps achieving provable
convergence of any Byzantine robust gradient filter, while El-Mhamdi et al. [33]
studied the boosting of robustness by momentum when computed at agents.
3.3.5 Studies under peer-to-peer architecture
Many methods, including the most of aforementioned gradient filters are proposed
under the server-based system architecture. Although we already mentioned in the
beginning of this section that we can simulate server-based algorithms under peer-
to-peer architecture using Byzantine broadcast primitive, it is worth noting that
there is also research specifically studies the peer-to-peer, or decentralized system
architecture. Note that in peer-to-peer settings the agents do not broadcast gradi-
ents, but rather their local estimates to other agents (recall (14), peer-to-peer DGD).
Su and Vaidya [102] showed that, based-on Byzantine consensus results on peer-
to-peer networks [110], a distributed optimization problem with scalar local cost
functions has a Byzantine-resilient gradient descent algorithm if the network has a
non-empty source component after removing all faulty agents and their edges. Sun-
daram and Gharesifard [104] proposed Local Filtering (LF) Dynamics, a protocol
that allows Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization in a f -local network,
i.e., each non-faulty agent i has up to f faulty neighbors in Ni, if the network sat-
isfies certain connectivity property called (r, s)-robustness.
Gupta et al. [48] studied the 2f -redundancy property in decentralized system.
Specifically, the authors proposed Comparative Elimination (abbr. CE) method,
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similar to gradient filters under server-based architecture, as a decentralized opti-
mization algorithm for a fully-connected network. The method will mitigate the
detrimental impact of potentially incorrect values from Byzantine faulty agents.
3.4 Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed learning
Distributed machine learning is a popular subproblem of distributed optimization.
Naturally, a lot of work in Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization also
focuses on the case of distributed learning. The formulation of Byzantine fault-
tolerant distributed learning problem is related to that of distributed optimization,
but with its own characteristics.
One typical formulation of the problem can be described as follows [19, 45, 49,
75, 120]. Suppose there are n agents in the system, out of them up to f can be
Byzantine faulty. The training data samples are drawn i.i.d. from some unknown
data distribution D. A machine learning model Θ has a learning parameter x in the
form of d-dimensional vectors. The model Θ decides a loss function `(x; z) for each
data point z ∼ D. Let Ez∼D denote the expectation with respect to the random
data sample z. The goal is to minimize with respect to x the function
Q(x) , Ez∼D [`(x; z)] , (25)
namely the population cost (or loss) function, i.e. find a point x̂ such that
x̂ ∈ arg min
x∈Rd
Q(x). (26)
Comparing this formulation with the general fault-tolerant distributed opti-
mization goal (6), we see that here, Qi(x) = Q(x) for every agent i, therefore,
2f -redundancy holds trivially. However, none of the agents, including the server,
knows the cost function exactly. For gradient-based algorithms, DGD should be
changed to distributed stochastic gradient descent (abbr. D-SGD) [49], where in-
stead of gradient gti = ∇Qi(xt), the agent i draws one or some data samples z or z
and computes its stochastic gradient
gti =
 ∇`(x; z), when drawing one data sample, or∇`(x; z) = ∑
z∈z
`(x; z), when drawing multiple data sample, (27)
in each iteration t.
Another more general formulation [51, 66, 68, 82] assumes each agent i has a
potentially different data distribution Di. Then each agent i has a local cost function
Qi(x) , Ez∼Di [`(x; z)] . (28)
The goal is to find a point x̂ that minimizes the aggregated cost functions of non-
faulty agents,





Note this goal is the same as (7). One application of this formulation is federated
learning [73], where different agents have different data samples and underlying data
distributions. Gradient filters like RSA [66], RFA [82], and RGE [26] are proposed
specifically under this formulation.
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3.5 Resilience notations
Given the facts that the original goal of distributed optimization (3) is not achievable
in presence of Byzantine faulty agents, and that there are a variety of ways to mea-
sure the resilience of a Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization algorithm,
here we introduce some of them.
(f, ε)-resilience (f, ε)-resilience [68] is a resilience notation for Byzantine fault-
tolerant distributed optimization algorithms. A deterministic algorithm is said to











Intuitively, to be (f, ε)-resilient, the output of the algorithm should be within ε dis-
tance to the true minimum point set. Furthermore, DGD with gradient filters, i.e.,
Algorithm 2 can achieve (f, ε)-resilience if the gradient satisfies certain conditions,
with several continuity and convexity assumptions; those gradient filters include
coordinate-wise trimmed mean and CGE [68]. (f, 0)-resilience is also called exact
fault-tolerance [45], requiring that the algorithm’s output satisfies the goal (7) ex-
actly. It is also shown that (2f, ε)-redundancy and 2f -redundancy are the necessary
conditions to (f, ε)-resilience and (f, 0)-resilience, respectively [45, 68].
(α, f)-resilience (α, f)-resilience [6] is a notation used for measuring a gradient
aggregation rule, under the same distribution setting of fault-tolerant distributed
learning. Suppose a group of vectors V1, ..., Vn ∈ Rd are drawn i.i.d. from some
distribution G, with E[G] = g. Also suppose B1, ..., Bf ∈ Rd be a group of arbitrary
vectors. An aggregation rule GradFilter is said to be (α, f)-Byzantine resilient for
some 0 ≤ α < π/2 if, for any 1 ≤ j1 ≤ ... ≤ jf ≤ n, the output vector of the
aggregation rule






(i) 〈E[V ], g〉 ≥ (1− sinα) · ‖g‖2 > 0;
(ii) For r = 2, 3, 4, E ‖V ‖2 is bounded above by a linear combination of terms
E ‖G‖r1 ,...,E ‖G‖rn−1 with r1 + ...+ rn−1 = r.
Intuitively, we want the output of a gradient filter to be close enough to the
expected gradient, and the filter can control the effects of the discrete nature of
SGD dynamics [8]. Some aforementioned gradient filters and others are known
to be (α, f)-Byzantine resilient, including Krum [7], geometric median [19, 115],
coordinate-wise median [115], mean near median [115], and Bulyan [75].
(δmax, c)-robust aggregator (δmax, c)-robust aggregator [60] is another notation
of measuring aggregation rules. Similarly, consider a group of independent random
vectors V1, ..., Vn, such that a non-faulty subset N ⊆ {1, ..., n} of size |N | ≥ (1− δ)n
satisfies that for any apriori fixed i, j ∈ N , E[Vi] = E[Vj ], and E ‖Vi − Vj‖2 ≤ ρ2 for
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some ρ. An aggregation rule GradFilter is said to be (δmax, c)-robust if its output
vector
V = GradFilter (V1, ..., Vn)
satisfies that for some constant c, E
∥∥∥∥V − 1|N |∑i∈N Vi
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ cδρ2. The authors
then argued that combining (δmax, c)-robust aggregator and momentum SGD, an
algorithm can solve distributed learning problems with non-convex smooth cost
functions.
4 Other fault-tolerant distributed optimization prob-
lems
Outside the scope of our discussion in Byzantine fault-tolerance distributed opti-
mization in Section 3, some other problems related to fault-tolerance in distributed
optimization are also studied.
4.1 Alternative adversarial models
There is a handful of recent researches considering specific adversarial models other
than Byzantine models, certain types of attacks against distributed optimization
algorithms, or analyzing possible behavior of an adversarial agent in the system.
Such research are rather ad hoc or unstructured, but still provide important view
points other than the common Byzantine model.
We use the similar notations as we used for Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed
optimization problems in Section 3; specifically, out of all agents V, H stands for
the set of honest agents, and B stands for the set of adversarial agents, with |V| = n
and |B| ≤ f .
Yin et al. [121] considers saddle point attack against existing Byzantine fault-
tolerant distributed (non-convex) learning algorithms. Many machine learning mod-
els have non-convex cost functions. Although gradient descent or its variants are
known to converge to a local minimum point with high probability [58, 64], Byzan-
tine agents can manipulate those methods into a fake local minimum near a saddle
point, i.e., saddle point attack. This is a specific type of attack that only hap-
pens when the cost function contains saddle points, at which the gradient of the
cost function would also be 0, and therefore satisfies the stopping criteria of many
Byzantine distributed learning algorithms. The authors proposed ByzantinePGD
with perturbation [58] to escape saddle point during the training process.
Wu et al. [113] discussed a data injection attack against distributed optimization
with peer-to-peer DGD update (14). Specifically, suppose the adversarial agents’
goal is to steer the final estimate of all agents to a target x ∈ Rd, an adversarial
agent i ∈ B will not send its local estimate xti to other agents, but rather x with
artificial noise zti , i.e. x+z
t
i . The adversarial agents will also try to behave as if they
are converging, having limt→∞
∥∥zti∥∥ a.s.= 0. The authors then proposed a local metric
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that trustworthy agents can compute to detect (notice the existence of an adver-
sary in its neighborhood) and localize (distinguish which neighbor is adversarial) the
adversarial agents performing such kind of attack. There is a group of research fo-
cusing on the detection of adversarial agents in distributed optimization [65, 86, 114].
Prasad et al. [83] studied two specific types of statistical models: (1) arbitrary
outliers in Huber’s ε-contamination model [54], and (2) heavy-tails, i.e., the data
distribution D has weak moment assumptions. The authors argued that such kind
of statistical models are common in real-world datasets. The authors then intro-
duced a class of robust estimators (gradient filters) with robustness guarantees for
a variety of statistical models: linear regression, logistic regression, and exponential
family models. Such robust estimators can be easily applied to distributed settings.
Ravi et al. [87] analyzed possible behavior of malicious agents in the system.
Suppose the malicious agents intend to manipulate its objective function, such that
the output using cost functions from all agents xa will deviate from a correct output
x∗ by a vector ε, i.e. xa = x∗ + ε. The authors derived that the magnitude of ε is
bounded by a function of the number of faults f , and the gradients of the malicious
agents. Therefore, in order to launch a substantial attack, either the value of f
needs to be large, or the gradients from malicious agents need to be large, which
might become giveaways of malicious agents.
Charikar et al. [16] views the fault-tolerance learning problem from a data per-
spective. It is assumed that the α fraction of the data is drown from an unknown
data distribution D and the rest (1− α) is not. The list-decodable learning returns
a list of poly(1/α) answers and one of them is correct. The semi-verified learning
suggests that if a small trusted dataset, also drawn from D, is provided, it is pos-
sible to use the trusted dataset to enable accurate extraction of information from
the larger dataset with untrusted data. Such findings can be applied to Byzantine
fault-tolerant distributed learning problems.
Based on resilient consensus with trusted agents [2], research shows that trusted
agents in the system can be crucial against adversarial agents [4, 34, 125]. Baras
and Liu [4] presented a trust-aware consensus algorithm in peer-to-peer networks
that can effectively detect Byzantine adversaries and exclude them, even in sparse
networks with connectivity less than 2f + 1. Zhao et al. [125] presented another
algorithm that if trusted agents induce a connected dominating set, the algorithm
outputs a point bounded by the convex minimum point set of weighted average of
all non-faulty agents’ cost functions.
4.2 Fault-tolerance and privacy
Privacy issue in optimization has gained increasing attention in recent years, in
both non-distributed settings [1, 25, 53, 93, 95] and distributed settings [57, 69, 76,
106, 118]. In distributed settings, some research proposes encryption-based methods
to prevent passive attackers from intercepting the exchanged information between
agents in the network [69, 106], while others utilizes differential privacy [76, 118], a
gold standard notion for privacy-preserving in data [31]. Informally, a differential-
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private algorithm is insensitive to small differences in its input dataset.
Some recent research tries to simultaneously achieve privacy-preservation and
fault-tolerance. He et al. [52] presented a Byzantine-resilient and privacy-preserving
machine learning solution with a two-server protocol. Achieving local differential
privacy [35], the data of each agent is secure against any other agents in the system,
and the two honest-but-curious servers. The Byzantine resilience can be provided
by any gradient filter, e.g., those we mentioned in Section 3.3.2, and the protocol
achieves the same result as non-private algorithms using the same gradient filter.
The authors also showed that their protocol only has negligible computation and
communication overhead comparing to non-private methods.
So et al. [94] proposed Byzantine-resilient secure aggregation (BREA) frame-
work to achieve both privacy-preservation and fault-tolerance in federated learning.
Different from the previous work, BREA only has one server in the system. The
secrecy among agents is achieved by a verifiable secret sharing protocol [36] ensuring
that updates from an agent cannot be learnt by other agents, while fault-tolerant ag-
gregation is managed by the server using a gradient filter such as Krum. It is worth
mentioning though, BREA does not have a provable differentially-private property.
Guerraoui et al. [42] analyzed the compatibility between differentially-private
noisy injection methods [76, 92] and Byzantine-resilient gradient filters for dis-
tributed learning under a one-server architecture (i.e., the server-based architec-
ture in Figure 1). The authors showed that in order to simultaneously guaran-
tee Byzantine-resilience and differential privacy, the agents must sample data with
batch size of the order of
√
d, where d is the parameter size of the machine learning
model. Such large batch size is often impractically large, since many state-of-the-
art machine learning models have a huge number of parameters [123]. The authors
further showed that, in strongly-convex cost function machine learning tasks, with
differentially-private noise injection, the training error rate of a Byzantine-resilient
gradient filter is of the order of
d
b2
, where b is the batch size; while non-private
training error rate of the same gradient filters is independent from d.
Needless to say, the last results of compatibility from [42] are rather frustrat-
ing. However, since this is an emerging research area, there are still many unex-
plored methods and mechanisms to be studied. As the authors of [42] pointed out,
Byzantine fault-tolerant methods other than gradient filters, and variance reduction
techniques [9] both still show potential based on their analysis.
5 Summary
This survey summarizes the current state of studies in the fault-tolerance problem of
distributed optimization, including both Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed opti-
mization and other fault-tolerant distributed optimization researches. For Byzantine
fault-tolerance distributed optimization, current researches studied the formulation
and solvability of the problem; the practical solutions to the problem, including
gradient filters, gradient coding methods, and other methods; the special case of
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Byzantine fault-tolerance in distributed learning; and commonly seen resilience no-
tations characterizing Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed optimization algorithms.
For other fault-tolerant distributed optimization researches, there is a group of work
that proposed and studied some specific adversarial models. There is also an emerg-
ing line of work that intends to combine both robustness and privacy to distributed
optimization algorithms.
5.1 Future work
Based on the findings in our survey, there are various open questions in this field.
We list some possible future work as follows.
Gradient filters Although there already are a variety of gradient filters presented
in this survey, many of them are either computationally extensive, or with weaker
convergence property or stochastic error rate (when applying to D-SGD). It is still
interesting to see if there are other gradient filters that can achieve both efficiency
and correctness. One interesting idea, similar to Bulyan that applies the same filter
multiple times, would be to see both theoretically and empirically effects of applying
multiple different gradient filters in the same fault-tolerant algorithm, i.e, the effects
of combinations. Also, efficiency could be achieved by heuristic filtering [43], instead
of applying the gradient filter in every iteration.
Peer-to-peer network The majority of Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms are
built under the server-based architecture, e.g., [6, 18, 49], etc.; while studies under
peer-to-peer architectures, although exist [47, 48], are rather rare, and the results
are not as systematic. It would be interesting to explore further how the commu-
nication network structure is related to solvability of the fault-tolerance problem,
and also practical algorithms to achieve fault-tolerance. Recall the difference of
DGD under peer-to-peer and server-based architectures, the most gradient filters
and other methods cannot be directly applied to peer-to-peer settings.
Asynchrony Asynchronous distributed optimization is a major branch of dis-
tributed optimization studies [55, 96, 124]. Although some previous work suggested
that their results can be easily extended to asynchronous setting, the combination of
asynchrony and fault-tolerance is still a topic to be explored. It would be interesting
to see some directed results on asynchronous systems, e.g., the effect of achieving
both goals on issues such as convergence property. For example, (f, r; ε)-redundancy,
an extension of (2f, ε)-redundancy discussed in Section 3.2 is proposed in [68], which
can be utilized to tackle both up to r stragglers and up to f Byzantine faulty agents
at the same time.
Privacy-preservation We already discussed the current attempts on combina-
tion of privacy-preservation and fault-tolerance. Still, this is an emerging topic with
real-world applications and impact.
Adversary models The majority of the fault-tolerant optimization researches
focus on Byzantine fault-tolerance, both in theory and in practice. However, in many
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real-world scenarios, such assumption may be too strong. A group of omnipotent
faulty agents that have knowledge on the algorithm, status of other agents, or even
all the data is unlikely in many cases. Instead, it is more likely that only a number of
faulty agents can collaborate with each other, or can be corrupted by an adversary
[27], or their adversarial behavior is limited.
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convexity for scalability. In Proceedings of the 23rd international conference
on Machine learning, pages 201–208, 2006.
[23] Andrew Cotter, Ohad Shamir, Nathan Srebro, and Karthik Sridharan. Bet-
ter mini-batch algorithms via accelerated gradient methods. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1106.4574, 2011.
[24] Ashok Cutkosky and Francesco Orabona. Momentum-based variance reduc-
tion in non-convex sgd. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.10018, 2019.
[25] Georgios Damaskinos, Celestine Mendler-Dünner, Rachid Guerraoui, Nikolaos
Papandreou, and Thomas Parnell. Differentially private stochastic coordinate
descent. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.07272, 2020.
[26] Deepesh Data and Suhas Diggavi. Byzantine-resilient sgd in high dimensions
on heterogeneous data. arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.07866, 2020.
24
[27] Carole Delporte-Gallet, Hugues Fauconnier, Rachid Guerraoui, and Andreas
Tielmann. The disagreement power of an adversary. Distributed Computing,
24(3):137–147, 2011.
[28] Danny Dolev. The byzantine generals strike again. Journal of algorithms, 3
(1):14–30, 1982.
[29] Xiwang Dong, Yongzhao Hua, Yan Zhou, Zhang Ren, and Yisheng Zhong.
Theory and experiment on formation-containment control of multiple multi-
rotor unmanned aerial vehicle systems. IEEE Transactions on Automation
Science and Engineering, 16(1):229–240, 2018.
[30] John C Duchi, Alekh Agarwal, and Martin J Wainwright. Dual averaging for
distributed optimization: Convergence analysis and network scaling. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic control, 57(3):592–606, 2011.
[31] Cynthia Dwork, Aaron Roth, et al. The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3-4):
211–407, 2014.
[32] El-Mahdi El-Mhamdi, Rachid Guerraoui, Arsany Guirguis, Lê Nguyên Hoang,
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A Appendix: Definition of some mathematical concepts
In this appendix, we note some definitions of the mathematical concepts mentioned
without explanation in the survey for readers’ reference.
A.1 Hausdorff distance
To begin with, the distance of two points x, y in d-dimensional Euclidean space Rd
induced by a given norm ‖·‖ is
dist (x, y) = ‖x− y‖ . (30)
The distance between a point x ∈ Rd and a set Y ⊂ Rd can then be defined as
dist (x, Y ) = inf
y∈Y
‖x− y‖ . (31)
The Hausdorff distance between two set X,Y ⊂ Rd is then defined as follows:









Note that the definition of 32 also applies to the distance between two points, or
between a point and a set, if viewing a point as a set with one element.
A.2 Diminishing step size
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Table 2: Summary of gradient filters. Cells with “-” indicates that information is not provided in the original resource or other research

















Yes O(n2d) Yes D-SGD
f < (n− 2)/2m-krum No O(n2d) Yes D-SGD





No O(nd) Yes D-SGD See [120]
Coordinate-wise
trimmed mean
No O(nd) Yes D-SGD f < n/2
Phocas No O(nd) - D-SGD f < n/2










- - - ε as approx.
param.














Yes D-SGD f ≤ (n− 1)/2
CGC Norm-
based
No O ((n+ f)d+ n log n) - linear regression f < n/2




No O((n− 2f)C + nd) Yes D-SGD f ≤ (n− 3)/4
C is the com-
plexity of a
filter
